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NOTES

Dubai or not Dubai?: A Review of
Foreign Investment and Acquisition
Laws in the U.S. and Canada
ABSTRACT

The proposed purchase of a British company that
controlled several ports in the United States by Dubai Ports
World could accurately be described as one of the most
politically contentious acquisitions in U.S. history.
The
transaction raised questions not only about U.S. foreign
investment laws but provoked national security concerns, as
well. Similar issues were raised more recently during the
acquisition of a share in Nasdaq by the Dubai stock exchange.
In the same vein, Canada has seen similar issues arise during
recent transactions involving domestic companies-most
notably the acquisition of PrimeWest Energy by TAQA, the
national energy company of Abu Dhabi. This Note attempts to
address the efficacy of the foreign investment laws of both the
U.S. and Canada in light of the political disputes that have
surrounded a number of transactionsin recent years. The Note
concludes that the best result for both countries would be to
maintain rigorous review standards while also establishing a
climate favorable to foreign investment. To this end, this Note
suggests the creation of Conciliation Committee, a bi-partisan
legislative committee that would act as a mediator between the
government and the parties to a contentious deal to ensure that
all sides are satisfied and that the deal will ultimately go
through.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Weighing in at number one on the U.S. Fortune 500, with over
6,775 retail stores is the behemoth known as Wal-Mart.'
The
company has become an international force by not only as the number
one retailer in both Canada and Mexico, but also by owning a 95%
stake in the Japanese retail company SEIYU and opening stores in
Asia, Europe, and South America.2 Meanwhile, topping Forbes' list of
the largest Canadian companies is Royal Bank of Canada (Royal

ID

1.
Hoovers, Wal-Mart Company Description, http://hoovers.com/wal-mart/-11600--/free-co-profile.xhtml (last visited Oct. 27, 2008).
2.
Id.
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Bank), with over $20.7 billion in sales in 2007. 3 Royal Bank has also
seen its fortunes grow internationally, as the Bank now has offices in
over thirty countries, including the United States. 4 While both
countries are undoubtedly pleased to see their homegrown companies
expand internationally, this development raises a question
concerning the response of each country in the face of an
international corporation looking to compete with or acquire a
domestic business.
In both the United States and Canada, policies directed at
foreign investments and acquisitions have long been a topic of5
contentious debate at a volume much louder than other countries.
Recent events in each country have reignited the debate over the
proper legal response to a foreign company looking to invest in or
acquire a domestic company. With national security concerns often
on the forefront of people's minds, the debates have become more
political and heated in recent years. These debates have raised a
number of questions in both countries as to how these cases should be
handled by the law.
This Note focuses on the recent laws that emphasize government
review of foreign investment and, in particular, foreign acquisitions
in both the United States and Canada. Part II starts by providing a
brief historical overview of the U.S. approach under the Committee
on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) and the ExonFlorio Amendments. It then summarizes recent changes in the law
and considers both sides of the debate over these changes. Part III
examines the Canadian system under the Investment Canada Act by
providing both a brief overview of the history of the law and examples
of current attitudes towards the system and the debate over whether
changes are necessary. Part IV focuses on recent transactions in each
country that have raised foreign investment issues. These include
the proposed CNOOC, Dubai Ports, and NASDAQ deals in the U.S.,
as well as the PrimeWest acquisition in Canada. Finally, Part V
analyzes the benefits and drawbacks of each approach while offering
suggestions on maintaining a standard of strict review while

Forbes.com, The Largest Companies in Canada, http://www.forbes.coml
3.
lists/2005/182/Rankl.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2008).
4.
Hoovers, RBC Financial Group Company Description, http://hoovers.coml
rbc.financial-group/--ID41448--/free-co-profile.xhtml (last visited Oct. 27, 2008).
5.
See Gaurav Sud, Note, From Fretting Takeovers to Vetting CF1US: Finding
a Balance in U.S. Policy Regarding Foreign Acquisitions of Domestic Assets, 39 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1303. 1315 (2006) (discussing the importance of monitoring foreign
investment); see also Matthew R. Byrne, Note, Protecting National Security and
PromotingForeign Investment: Maintainingthe Exon-Florio Balance, 67 OHIO ST. L.J.
849, 856 (2006) (describing the creation of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the
United States). See generally Jean Raby, The Investment Provisions of the CanadaUnited States Free Trade Agreement: A Canadian Perspective, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 394

(1990) (discussing the negotiations and reasoning behind the Free Trade Agreement).
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simultaneously promoting foreign investment and sustaining a proinvestment image globally.

II. THE U.S.: CFIUS AND THE EXON-FLORIO AMENDMENTS
A. History of CFIUS and the Exon-FlorioAmendments
Gerald Ford created CFIUS in 1975 with the signing of
Executive Order 11,858.6 At the time, CFIUS consisted of six
members and was tasked with "monitoring the impact of foreign
investment in the United States" and "coordinating the
implementation of United States policy on such investment. ' 7 It has
been posited that the major external motivation for the creation of
CFIUS was the earlier establishment of the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which gave oil exporting
nations extra capital that could have been used to purchase U.S.
8
assets.
Fears of such transactions were realized in cases such as the
1981 proposed transaction between the Kuwait Petroleum Company
and the U.S.-based Santa Fe International Company. 9 The U.S.
government did not approve of the transaction; however, under the
original Executive Order, neither CFIUS nor the President possessed
the authority to block foreign takeovers of U.S. companies. Instead,
the committee and the President could only generally review such
transactions.1 0 The government managed to stall the transaction by
invoking antitrust law until a more suitable agreement came along. 1
The perceived sense of helplessness of the executive branch in the
face of such transactions led to the passage of legislation to ensure
that such cases would not happen again.
In 1988 Congress passed the Exon-Florio Amendments (ExonFlorio) to the Defense Production Act of 1950.12 Much like the
creation of CFIUS, external forces may have prompted the passage of
the measure. As opposed to OPEC, the inspiration for CFIUS rested
in the number of large purchases of U.S. business by Japanese firms
in the 1980s, including well-known New York buildings, Hollywood

6.
Exec. Order No. 11,858, 3 C.F.R. 990 (1971-1975); Byrne, supra note 5, at
856.
7.
Byrne, supra note 5, at 856-57.
8.
Sud, supra note 5, at 1315.
9.
Id.
10.
Byrne, supra note 5, at 857; see also Sud, supra note 5, at 1315 (explaining
that the executive branch was helpless in the proposed transaction between Kuwait
Petroleum Company and Santa Fe International Company because of the liberal U.S.
statutory framework regarding merger activity).
11.
Sud, supra note 5, at 1315.
12.
Id. at 1315-16.
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movie studios, and a large U.S. semi-conductor business. 13 Before the
passage of Exon-Florio, many in Congress believed that the President
only could block the foreign acquisition of a U.S. company by
declaring a national emergency. 14 Exon-Florio explicitly addressed
these concerns by empowering the President to "investigate and, if
necessary, block foreign takeovers of American businesses on national
security grounds."'1 5
More explicitly, Exon-Florio allowed the
President to look at the potential national security implications of all
,'mergers and acquisitions involving foreign persons which could
result in foreign control of persons engaged in interstate commerce in
16
the United States."'
The President delegated his authority under Exon-Florio to
CFIUS through Executive Order 12,661.17 CIFUS currently consists
of twelve interagency members and is housed in and chaired by the
Treasury Department.'8 The expanded panel has representatives
from across the government, including:
[T]he Secretaries of State, Treasury, Defense, Homeland Security, and
Commerce; the United States Trade Representative; the Chairman of
the Council of Economic Advisors; the Attorney General; the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget; the Director of the Office of
Science and Technology Policy; the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs; and the Assistant to the President for
19
Economic Policy.

CFIUS is also overseen by the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs Committee currently chaired by Senator Christopher Dodd of
20
Connecticut with ranking member Richard Shelby of Alabama.
CFIUS now exercises the President's power under Exon-Florio and
executes the explicit mandate given to CFIUS to consider foreign
21
investment issues.

13.
Joshua W. Casselman, Note, China's Latest "Threat" to the United States:
The Failed CNOOC-UNOCAL Merger and Its Implications for Exon-Florio and CFIUS,
17 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 155, 169 (2007).
14.
Id. at 157.
15.
Sud, supra note 5, at 1316.
16.
Byrne, supra note 5, at 854.
17.
Exec. Order No. 12,661, 3 C.F.R. 618 (1988); Casselman, supra note 13, at
157-58.
18.
Casselman, supra note 13, at 158.
19.
Id.
20.
Id.
21.
See id. at 157-58 (describing the president's authority under Exon-Florio
and then stating that the president delegated his authority to CFIUS).
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B. The Functioningof CFIUS Under Exon-Florio
CFIUS under Exon-Florio follows a fairly straight-forward
process for addressing potential purchases of U.S. companies by
foreign buyers. The four-step process involves:
(1) [V]oluntary notice by the companies, (2) a 30-day review to identify
whether there are any national security concerns, (3) a 45-day
investigation to determine whether those concerns require a
recommendation to the President for possible action, and (4) a
22
Presidential decision to permit, suspend, or prohibit the acquisition.

Since Exon-Florio's inception, CFIUS has received over 1,500
23
notifications from parties looking to transact with foreign buyers.
Either or both parties provide notice of a transaction by filing
documentation with the Committee that a deal is being
contemplated. 24 The notice must contain details about both the
foreign buyer and the U.S. target company. 25 The notices must
disclose information such as "business the target company does with
US government agencies having national security responsibilities, the
target company's technology having national security significance,
the business plan of the proposed acquirer for the target company and
its technology, including any plans to move technology or jobs
offshore." 26 The chair of the Committee also maintains the right to
reject any notice as incomplete and ask for additional information
27
before moving on to the next step in the process.
Parties have a strong incentive to file notice voluntarily with the
Committee because the President can require companies to divest
deals that represent a threat to national security when completed
without a notification filing. 28 Moreover, the absence of a voluntary
filing of notice does not preclude a member of CFIUS to ask the
29
Committee to review an unreported transaction.
After a party files voluntary notice and receives Committee
approval to proceed, there is a preliminary thirty day review of the
transaction by CFIUS. 30 During its review, the Committee decides
whether it possesses jurisdiction to conduct a comprehensive review
of the transaction to determine if approving the transactions raises a
threat to national security. 31 CFIUS may consider the following

22.
23.
24.
25.
REV., Sept.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Sud, supra note 5, at 1316.
Casselman, supra note 13, at 159.
Byrne, supra note 5, at 854-55.
Barry E. Cohen & Alan WH Gourley, Heightened Security, INT'L FIN. L.
2007, at 24.
Id.
Id.
Casselman, supra note 13, at 159.
Byrne, supra note 5,at 855.
Cohen & Gourley, supra note 25.
Id.
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factors in its determination of the potential threat to national
security:
(1) [Dlomestic production needed for projected national defense
requirement, (2) the capability and capacity of domestic industries to
meet national defense requirements, including the availability of
human resources, products, technology, materials, and other supplies or
services, [and] (3) the control of domestic industries and commercial
activity by foreign citizens as it affects the capability of the United
States to meet the requirements of national security .... 32

If the Committee determines that further review is necessary, it
then expands its consideration of the transaction by an additional
forty-five days. 33 During this time, CFIUS may request additional
information from the parties to complete the process.3 4 In fact,
foreign state-run firms acquiring control over U.S companies require
expanded review. 35 Otherwise, extending the allotted time seldom
occurs--only twenty-five cases have extended beyond the thirty day
period, of which the foreign acquirer withdrew thirteen proposals
36
while the remaining twelve proceeded to the final step of review.
Upon receipt of the CFIUS report, the President decides whether
to exercise the powers given to him under Exon-Florio.
The
President has fifteen days to decide whether to permit, suspend, or
prohibit the transaction. 37 If the President finds "credible evidence"
that the transaction may threaten or impair national security and
that laws other than Exon-Florio and the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act are insufficient to protect national security, he
may prohibit the transaction. 38 The prohibition power is largely
discretionary because Exon-Florio never explicitly defines "national
security" other than to list several instances in which the power
should not be invoked, including proposals in certain industries (toys,
hotels, food products, legal services) or involving a purchase of stock
amounting to less than ten percent of an entity. 39 The veto provision
was used only once by President George H.W. Bush over the proposed
acquisition of a U.S. aircraft parts manufacturer by a Chinese
aerospace company in 1990, which indicates that this requirement
40
has largely been a mere formality to approval.

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Sud, supra note 5, at 1316-17.
Byrne, supra note 5, at 855.
Cohen & Gourley, supra note 25.
Byrne, supra note 5, at 855.
Casselman, supra note 13, at 159-60.
Sud, supranote 5, at 1317.
Id.
Id. at 1317-18.
Id. at 1317.
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C. The Debate over Recent Additions to Exon-Florio and CFIUS
The most recent addition to the Exon-Florio and CFIUS catalog
has come in the form of the Foreign Investment and National
Security Act of 2007 (FINSA).4 1 Like many of the attempts at
reforming CFIUS in recent years, FINSA was a response to a
Government Accountability Office (GAO) report assessing the
operations of CFIUS. 42 The GAO found that CFIUS's use of ExonFlorio limited its effectiveness by: (1) using the Treasury's narrow
definition of a "threat to national security"; and (2) being reluctant to
initiate forty-five-day investigations out of fear of their potential
negative impact on foreign investment conflicting with the general
43
U.S. policy of open investment.
Addressing the GAO concerns, the avowed purpose of FINSA is
to "ensure national security while promoting foreign investment and
the creation and maintenance of jobs, [and] to reform the process by
which such investments are examined for any effect they may have
on national security. '44 There has been an ongoing debate, however,
over whether this Act will be effective in achieving its purpose.
FINSA implements a number of small changes aimed at making
government review of potential acquisitions by foreign buyers "more
transparent and predictable without making the business climate less
friendly to foreign investors. '45 One of the features involves the
creation of specific standards to consider in evaluating a
These standards encompass stricter review of
transaction. 46
transactions involving state-run businesses as well as those involving
"critical infrastructure
and critical technologies," including
acquisitions of power plants, ports, toll roads, and other such
47
businesses.
FINSA extends review of transaction beyond those conducted by
CFIUS and the President. The Act requires that both the Director of
National Intelligence and the Secretary of the Treasury conduct their
own reviews of such transactions. 48 It also requires a greater level of
disclosure to Congress regarding CFIUS's review of foreign

41.
Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-49,
112 Stat. 246 (2007).
42.
See Sud, supra note 5, at 1321 (explaining the findings of the GAO report).
43.
Casselman, supra note 13, at 170-71.
44.
H.R. Res. 556, 110th Cong. (2007) (enacted).
45.
Andrzej Zwaniecki, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Investment in U.S. To
Get More Transparent Scrutiny, AMERIcA.GOV, July 20, 2007, http://www.america.gov/
st/washfileenglish2007/July/20070720172524saikceinawzO.2031519.html.
USLaw.com, Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007,
46.
http://www.uslaw.com/us law-article.php?a=320 Oast visited Oct. 27, 2008).
47.
Cohen & Gourley, supra note 25.
48.
USLaw.com, supra note 46.
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investments. 49 One other change in FINSA involves the promotion of
"mitigation agreements," which mandate that investors take certain
actions to address potential security concerns in order to gain
approval from the government. 50 There was precedent for these
agreements, such as in 2000 when a Japanese firm's acquisition of
the U.S.-based Internet service provider Verio was allowed on the
condition that the Japanese government agreed not to have any
51
involvement with the firm after the conclusion of the transaction.
In promoting FINSA, the Bush administration largely touted the
measure as a compromise of sorts with Congress and a means to
improve and reform the CFIUS system. 52 The Treasury Department
noted recent controversies over particular foreign investments as well
as "troubling signs that other countries are pursuing barriers to
foreign investment, and increasingly negative media coverage of the
53
U.S. investment climate" as reasons necessitating the changes.
Others have said that these reforms would give Congress greater
confidence in the CFIUS review process and would deter potential
political conflicts over their decisions. 54 Proponents of the bill have
also been quick to point out that scrutiny of such transactions has not
affected U.S. openness to such deals because "CFIUS has reviewed on
average only about 5 percent of such deals per year, restricting or
blocking only a few" since 2000, and while foreign investment is still
well below its peak in 2000 at $321 billion, there was a "sharp
upsurge in 2006 that brought it to $183 billion. '55
FINSA has not been entirely well received, however, as some
have been critical of the changes required by the new Act. Critics
have bristled at the extension of CFIUS review to transactions
beyond those related specifically to homeland security and to those
that implicate "critical infrastructure and critical technologies. '56
These critics are concerned about creating such broad standards that
by "some estimates, the business sectors encompassed by these terms
comprise over 65% of the domestic US economy," potentially bringing
a significant part of the U.S. economy under the reach of CFIUS

49.
Zwaniecki, supra note 45.
50.
Id.
51.
Casselman, supra note 13, at 161.
52.
See infra Part III. See generally Press Release, The Department of the
Treasury, Testimony of Treasury Assistant Secretary Clay Lowery Before the House
Financial Services Committee (Feb. 7, 2007), available at http://www.treas.gov/
press/releaseshp250.htm [hereinafter Treasury Department Press Release] (discussing
the tensions involved between CFJUS and Congress that helped lead to the Act's
formation).
53.
Treasury Department Press Release, supra note 52.
54.
Zwaniecki, supra note 45.
55.
Id.
56.
Cohen & Gourley, supra note 25.
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review. 57 There also appears to be a general distaste toward the
prospect of a CFIUS application becoming a "required stop in the
process of evaluating, negotiating and closing an investment58in a US
business with substantial industrial or technology activities.
From its humble beginnings as Executive Order 11,858 to
FINSA, CFIUS and Exon-Florio have come to define the quantity of
foreign investment handled in the United States. 59 Over the years,
CFIUS's power has grown to a level that has led to conflicts with
other branches of the government regarding the balancing of national
security concerns with the promotion of foreign investment. The
pertinent quandary then becomes the maintenance of that balance,
especially considering that foreign countries may be headed toward
an approach less favorable to foreign investment.

III. CANADA: THE INVESTMENT CANADA ACT

A. CanadianInvestment Before the Investment CanadaAct
The strictness of Canadian governmental review of foreign
investments has ebbed and flowed over the years based in part on
public opinion and political control. 60 The Canadian approach has
vacillated from laissez-faire to strict controls.
Prior to the 1970s, the Canadian investment climate was open to
foreigners and free of significant barriers to completing foreign
acquisitions transactions. 61 During the 1970s, however, concerns
arose about the high level of foreign investment and its potentially
negative effects on the economy. 62 The 1972 Gray Report legitimized
the concerns finding that "nearly 60 percent of manufacturing
activities and 76 percent of the energy sector were foreign controlled,
and that, in certain industries, such foreign ownership exceeded 90
percent. '63 The Gray Report found that foreign investment was "so
prevalent as to impede legitimate Canadian economic objectives" and
64
recommended a general review policy for foreign investments.
Accordingly, in 1974, the Canadian government enacted the
Foreign Investment Review Act (FIRA) that established the Foreign

Id.
57.
Id.
58.
59.
See Casselman, supra note 13, at 159 (noting the approximately 1,500
voluntary notices that have been filed with CIFUS since the adoption of the ExonFlorio Amendments).
60.
See Raby, supra note 5, at 395-97 (discussing changes in Canadian
investment law as they coincided with changes in political control and public opinion).
61.
Id. at 395.
62.
Id.
Id.
63.
Id.
64.
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Investment Review Agency (Review Agency) to address these
concerns. 65 Under FIRA, the Review Agency reviewed all direct
foreign investment in Canada and approved such transactions before
they could proceed. 6 6 The final decision rested in the hands of the
67
Cabinet Council, to whom the Review Agency repdrted.
In the early 1980s, the tide of permissive foreign investment
ebbed following a national recession and mounting criticism of FIRA
by the international community. 68 As the country saw the effects of a
downturn in foreign investment, "economic nationalism no long[er]
assumed paramount importance in Ottawa. '69 The new Conservative
government rose to power in September 1984 and cemented the
movement away from such a policy. 70 The new government spelled
the beginning of the end for FIRA and its stricter controls over
foreign investments.
B. The Investment CanadaAct
The Conservatives' accession to power led to the passage of the
Investment Canada Act (ICA) and prompted new Prime Minister
Mulroney to proclaim boldly that "Canada is open for business
again. '7 1 According to Prime Minister Mulroney, the explicit purpose
of the new act was "to encourage investment in Canada by Canadians
and non-Canadians that contributes to economic growth and
employment opportunities and to provide for the review of significant
investments in Canada by non-Canadians in order to assure such
benefits to Canada," primarily by raising the threshold for review,
shortening the time for review, and streamlining the process in
72
general.
Under the ICA, parties to direct or indirect investment by a nonCanadian resulting in the creation of a new business or the takeover
of a Canadian business must file a notice or application for review
with the Investment Canada review board. 73 Monetary thresholds
relating to the size of the transaction determine the cases eligible for

65.
Id.
66.
Canadian Legislation Is Designed to Attract Foreign Investment, BUS. AM.,
Aug. 5, 1985, at 24, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_mlO52/isv8
ai_3885605.
67.
Id.
68.
Raby, supra note 5, at 395.
69.
Id. at 395.
70.
Id.
71.
Id. at 396-97.
72.
Id. at 397.
73.
Jason McKenzie, Canada: Canadian Government to Reconsider Foreign
Investment Review Provisions of the Investment Canada Act, MONDAQ Bus. BRIEFING,

Aug. 7, 2007, availableat http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=50448.
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review. 74 The thresholds trigger review in three situations: (1) a
direct acquisition of control in a Canadian business with more than
C$5 million in assets; (2) an indirect acquisition of control of a
Canadian business with over C$50 million in assets; or (3) the
indirect acquisition of a Canadian business with over C$5 million in
assets "where the Canadian assets acquired represent more than 50
percent of the aggregate gross asset value of all domestic and
international business acquired, directly and indirectly, in connection
'75
with the transaction.
Transactions may require review where the business is related to
"Canada's cultural heritage or national identity," even if the
transaction does not meet the monetary threshold. 76 While the ICA
gives no explicit definition of what businesses will relate to "cultural
heritage or national identity," businesses involved in the production,
distribution, sale, or exhibition of books, magazines, periodicals,
newspapers, film, or music (recordings and print) have all been found
to be covered by this provision. 77 The non-Canadian acquisition of
such a business, either directly or indirectly, leads to governmental
review regardless of whether the acquisition meets the monetary
78
threshold requirements.
If either of the standards-the financial standard and the
cultural standard-is met, the investor must apply for review of the
transaction by Investment Canada.7 9 The transaction must receive a
certificate of approval from either the Minister of Industry when the
monetary threshold is met, or the Minister of Canadian Heritage
when the transaction implicates cultural heritage.8 0 In rare cases
involving transactions that meet both standards, both Ministers must
approve.8 1 The certificate of approval attests to the fact that the
reviewing agency believes that the transaction would be a "net benefit
to Canada. '8 2 If the investment would not provide a net benefit to
Canada, the transaction is stopped or, if the transaction has already
83
been completed, the investor may be required to divest control.
In determining whether a transaction will be of net benefit to the
country, Investment Canada weighs a number of different factors.
Section 20 of the Act sets out several factors to be considered,
including:

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Raby, supra note 5, at 397.
Id.
Id. at 398.
Id.
Id.
Id.
McKenzie, supra note 73.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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[T]he effect of the investment on the level and nature of economic
activity in Canada; the degree and significance of participation by
Canadians in the business in question; the effect of the investment on
productivity, industrial efficiency, technological development, product
innovation and product variety in Canada; the effect of the investment
on Competition within Canada; the compatibility of the investment
with national industrial, economic and cultural policies; and the
contribution of the investment to Canada's ability to compete in world
84
markets.

The ICA further provides that these factors are to be considered as a
whole and that each factor be given "different weight in different
circumstances" depending on the specific facts of each case.8 5 Thus,
the government has created even more definite guidelines for some
"politically sensitive and economically important sectors of the
economy," like the telecommunication and the oil and gas
industries.8 6 It is also of particular interest to note that none of the
87
factors consider the transaction's effect on national security.
Overall, the review process is flexible in order to allow Investment
Canada to consider a multitude of different factors that can be
tailored in the way that the reviewer deems most appropriate for each
transaction as opposed to formulaic application of the same factors to
every transaction regardless of circumstance.
C. ICA in Practice Today
The Conservatives passed the ICA with the intent of boosting
foreign investment in the country. The government wanted to
simplify the system by streamlining the process and enable potential
investors to complete transactions within a reasonable time.8 8 To
this end, the ICA appears to have largely achieved its purpose-it
seldom operates as a real barrier to the foreign acquisition of
Canadian companies as the vast majority of the deals reviewed under
89
the ICA have been approved without much conflict.
The one exception to this generally laissez-faire attitude toward
foreign investment has been in politically sensitive industries. For
example, general government policy prohibits the acquisition of
healthy Canadian businesses in the oil and gas industry, which led to
the demise of a proposed takeover of the Canadian Bow Valley

84.
Raby, supra note 5, at 398-99.
85.
Id. at 399.
86.
Id.
87.
See McKenzie, supra note 73 ("[Tlhese factors do not, however, explicitly
require that the Minister consider whether a proposed transaction is injurious to
national security.").
88.
See Raby, supra note 5, at 396 (describing the reasons behind creating the
ICA).
89.
See McKenzie, supra note 73 ("The government of the day has, on several
occasions, said that it will generally not meddle with market forces.").
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Industries, Inc. by British Gas PLC when the government refused to
make an exception.9"
Otherwise, the policy facilitates foreign
investment because the government has not formally voided a
proposed transaction since the law's enactment in 1985.91 Rather
than use the ICA to stop transactions, the government preferred
using the review process to obtain concessions from potential foreign
investors through side agreements.
Canada has also experienced a rise in concern regarding the
perceived dangers of permitting large amounts of foreign investment,
which mirrors the recent concerns over foreign investment in the
United States. In May 2007, the opposition Liberal Party called for a
moratorium on foreign takeovers until the ICA was reviewed. 9 2 In
the twelve months prior, a number of prominent Canadian
corporations had been acquired by foreign investors, including
Hudson's Bay Co., Four Seasons Hotels, Inc., and La Senza, leading
to fears that the country had become "the boy scouts of the world in
this area. ' 9 3 In July 2007, the government established a review
panel, the Competition Policy Review Panel, charged with reviewing
the ICA to determine its current efficacy and suggest possible
reforms. 94 The panel returned its final report in June 2008 with
recommendations on future implementation of the Act and utilizing
foreign investment to strengthen Canadian business. 95
While the Review Panel investigates the current state of the
ICA, there have also been a number of proposals from other sources
in Ottawa that suggest additional changes to the Act. Among the
proposed changes would be considering the state-owned status of a
foreign investor and whether an investment by a state-owned
enterprise may be used to serve the interests of the foreign
government rather than Canada's interests. 96 Further, there is a
push to include a provision that would allow Investment Canada to
screen and possibly prevent acquisitions that raise concerns about
"national security," in an effort to target potential acquisitions by
investors with ties to organized crime or terrorism. 97

90.
Raby, supra note 5, at 399.
91.
McKenzie, supra note 73.
92.
Stephen Chase, Liberals Aim to Reduce Foreign Takeovers, THE GLOBE AND
MAIL (Canada), May 28, 2007, at A7.
93.
Id.
94.
Anthony F. Baldanza & Douglas C. New, Canada: Whither Foreign
Investment in Canada?, Oct. 26, 2007, http://www.mondaq.comlarticle.asp?articleid=
53660; Cliff Sosnow et al., Canada: Foreign State-Owned Investors Spark "National
Security" Concerns, BLAKES BULL. ON INT'L TRADE, Oct. 23, 2007, available at
http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=53328.
95.
COMPETITION POLICY REVIEW PANEL, COMPETE TO WIN-FINAL REPORT
(2008), available at http://www.ic.gc.ca/epic/site/cprp-gepmc.nsf/vwapj/Compete-to
Win.pdf/$FILE/Compete to-Win.pdf; Sosnow et al., supra note 94.
96.
McKenzie, supra note 73.
97.
Id.
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In 2005, Bill C-59 originally targeted potential acquisitions by
investors with nefarious connections by advocating the consideration
of national security concerns under the ICA.98 With a change in
government and opposition by some officials, however, the Bill
floundered and was never passed. 99 The implementation of a number
of the suggestions risks creating a climate antagonistic to promoting
foreign acquisition, which runs counter to the original intentions of
the Canadian government in passing the ICA.

IV. RECENT AND

CURRENT CONFLICTS OVER THE LAWS

A. The United States
For many years, the U.S. held a positive view on foreign
investment and attempted to implement policies promoting this
general belief. The post-9/11 period, however, ushered in a new era of
concerns and brought to the forefront a number of issues related to
national security. In recent years, the U.S. began to see a number of
cases raising national security concerns, and the current regime
under CFIUS and Exon-Florio may prove insufficient to address such
concerns.
The first major case raising such issues involved a
potential acquisition by the China National Offshore Oil Corporation
(CNOOC) of the U.S. corporation Unocal, which triggered "one of the
100
most politically charged merger battles in U.S. history."
i.

CNOOC

By 2005, China sought to increase extensively its assets in the
energy market to meet an ever-increasing demand, and, as part of its
policy, China made an unsolicited $18.5 billion offer for the U.S.
energy company Unocal. 0°1
CNOOC is one of China's largest oil
producers but, more importantly, seventy percent of the firm is owned
by a state-controlled company.10 2 CNOOC's bid topped that of the
nearest competitor, the U.S.-owned Chevron Corporation, by $2
billion. 10 3 Despite assurances from the Chinese foreign minister that
the proposed acquisition represented merely "normal commercial
activity between enterprises" and was being done because it "makes

98.
Baldanza & New, supra note 94.
99.
Id.
100.
Casselman, supra note 13, at 161 (quoting Christopher Palmeri, Unocal
Goes out with a Bang, Bus. WK. ONLINE, Aug. 11, 2005, http://www.businessweek.com
bwdaily/dnflash/aug2005/nf200508118247_db017.htm).
101.
Id. at 161-62.
102. Id. at 162.
103.
Sud, supra note 5, at 1304.
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sound business sense for our company," the proposal set off a number
10 4
of alarms in the U.S.
Shortly after the bid was announced, the matter became a hot
topic of concern in Congress. CNOOC attempted to assuage those
concerns by making a number of concessions. 10 5 CNOOC agreed to
continue selling most of the U.S.-produced oil and gas to U.S.
customers, to retain almost all of Unocal's employees, and to attempt
to retain as much of the current management as possible following
the acquisition. 10 6 Further, CNOOC also agreed to make a voluntary
10 7
filing with CFIUS for review and approval of the transaction.
Congress quickly responded to the conciliation attempts by
CNOOC but remained largely undeterred from its previous stance of
skepticism toward the transaction. 0 8 During the summer of 2005,
Congress passed several measures expressing opposition to the deal
and requested that the President conduct a thorough investigation of
the proposition. House Resolution 344, one of the most prominent of
these bills-passed by a wide margin of 398 to 15-expressed the
concern that the transaction potentially impaired the national
security of the United States and called for the President to review
the deal immediately upon its execution. 10 9 In addition, the passage
of House Amendment 431 on the same day cut off funding to CFIUS
by prohibiting the Treasury Department from making any
expenditures involved in approving the deal." 0 The Senate also
made attempts to have its voice heard on the transaction by including
a proposed joint resolution that would prohibit the transaction from
proceeding outright."'
The congressional response to the proposed acquisition had its
own effect on the decision making of the CNOOC board." 2 The board
soon elected to withdraw its bid for Unocal before even having a
chance to be investigated by CFIUS or the President, citing
"unprecedented political oppression" and the creation of "a level of
uncertainty that presents an unacceptable risk" to securing the
completion of the deal." 3
The CNOOC board also noted its
willingness to "further improv[e] the terms of its offer, and [that it]
would have done so but for the ... political environment in the

104.
FM: CNOOC's Unocal Bid Is Pure Business, CHINADAILY, June 29, 2005,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/englishdoc/2005-06/29/content_455555.htm.
105.
Casselman, supra note 13, at 162-63.
106.
Id.
107.
Sud, supra note 5, at 1305.
108.
Id.
109.
Casselman, supra note 13, at 163.

110.
111.
112.
113.
Withdraw

Id.
Id.
Sud, supra note 5, at 1305.
Id. at 1306 (quoting Press Release, CNOOC, Ltd., CNOOC Limited to
Unocal Bid (Aug. 2, 2005) [hereinafter CNOOC, Ltd. Press Release]).

2008]

FOREIGN INVESTMENTAND ACOUISITION

U.S. 11 4 Soon thereafter, Unocal accepted the Chevron bid-by then
raised to $17 billion-and gained shareholder approval of the
transaction. 115 Approximately six months later, CNOOC announced
that it had entered into a $2.27 billion acquisition of a forty-five
percent share of a Nigerian oil and gas field, demonstrating continued
efforts to expand its energy holdings.
ii.

Dubai Ports World

In 2006, news came that Dubai Ports World (DPW), owned by
the Emir of Dubai (part of the United Arab Emirates), was seeking to
acquire the British Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation
Company (P&O) for $6.8 billion. 116 The transaction raised eyebrows
in the U.S. because P&O operates a number of port terminals across
the world, including six ports in the U.S., and the transaction would
give operational control over these American sites to DPW. 117 Unlike
CNOOC, the Dubai Ports deal reached CFIUS, which approved the
deal because the panel found no concern large enough that merited
blocking the transaction or necessitating an extra forty-five day
investigation.11 8 CFIUS's approval caused a political storm to erupt
in Washington.
Much as it had with the CNOOC deal, Congress stepped in,
voiced its disapproval with the potential deal, and passed legislation
asking the President to examine the deal. 119 The largest concern
raised by most members of Congress involved questions of national
security because a U.S. transportation hub would be managed and
controlled by an Arab country. 12° As Representative Peter King of
New York stated, it was "only 4 , 5 years ago that they were very
close to bin Laden, they were supporting Taliban... and unless
'121
there's been a complete transformation, I have real concerns.
Other critics attempted to reinforce the significant risks associated
with providing an Arab country with wider access to the U.S.
economy by pointing out that the United Arab Emirates housed some
of the 9/11 hijackers and functioned as a source of terrorist
funding.122

114.

Id. (quoting CNOOC, Ltd. Press Release, supra note 113).

115.

Id.

116.
Byrne, supra note 5, at 876-77.
117.
Id. at 877.
118.
Sud, supra note 5, at 1308.
119,
Jonathan Weisman, Port Deal to Have BroaderReview; Dubai Firm Sought
U.S. Security Probe, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 2006, at Al; see also Sud, supra note 5, at
1308-09 (describing the congressional role in the CNOOC deal).
120.
Sud, supra note 5, at 1308-09; Weisman, supra note 119.
121.
Weisman, supra note 119.
122.
Byrne, supranote 5, at 879.
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Congress introduced legislation that would require the
Administration to proceed with the forty-five-day review despite
CFIUS's decision that it was unnecessary. 123 Before the legislation
passed, DPW agreed with CFIUS to move forward with the extended
forty-five day investigation despite CFIUS's decision. 124
The
Administration and the small band of the deal's supporters in
Congress attempted to use the concessions to signal that the company
was willing to cooperate with an extended investigation. 125 Senator
John Warner pointed to the "willingness of this company to give every
means of support to help work this thing out," while White House
spokesman Scott McClellan assured that "the additional time and
investigation at the request of the company will provide Congress
with a better understanding of the facts, and that Congress will be
126
comfortable with the transaction moving forward once it does.'
Despite reassurances by the Administration and defenders of the
deal, Congress remained skeptical; the House Appropriations
Committee voted 62-2 to essentially block the deal from proceeding
and continued to apply pressure on the Administration to step in and
take action. 127 Citing "extreme public and political pressure," DPW
128
agreed to relinquish potential control over the American seaports.
The interest in the U.S. seaports was transferred to an American
buyer, instead. 129 Congress achieved its short-term goal of stopping
the DPW acquisition of the U.S. seaports. 130 The controversy over the
deal, however, also caused members of Congress to questions whether
the Exon-Florio system as a whole needed reform because it
originally approved the transaction without recommending further
13 1
investigation.
iii.

NASDAQ

In the closing months of 2007, an opportunity arose for another
large controversy regarding the potential acquisition of a U.S.
company by a foreign buyer; however, the transaction failed to
generate the firestorm found in the CNOOC and DPW deals. In
September 2007, the government-owned stock exchange in Dubai
announced that it had plans to acquire a large part of both the

123.
Id. at 878.
124.
Id.
125.
See Weisman, supra note 119.
126.
Id.
127.
Byrne, supra note 5, at 852.
128.
Sud, supra note 13, at 1309 (quoting Gwyneth K. Shaw & Julie Herschfed
Davis, Dubai Firm to Shed Stake in U.S. Ports, BALTIMORE SUN, Mar. 10, 2006, at 1A).
129.
Byrne, supra note 5, at 852-53.
130.
See id. (discussing congressional outcry against possible DPW control of
U.S. ports).
131.
Id. at 853.
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London Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ exchange in New York. 132
The deal would give Dubai a 19.9% share of NASDAQ and 28% of the
London Exchange, becoming the largest single investor in the
NASDAQ market. 133 In exchange, Dubai agreed to take over OMX, a
Swedish equity market based in Stockholm that operated in several
Scandinavian and Baltic States, and transfer the shares to NASDAQ,
. 134
ending a recent bidding war between the exchanges
135
The deal drew some initial criticism.
Most prominently,
Senator Charles Schumer noted that the "deal gives me pause," and
that "we must still be careful of the kinds of investments made in our
critical infrastructure, financial exchanges, utilities and other areas
36
that are vital to the operation and security of our country."'
Interestingly though, Senator Schumer was largely in the minority,
as most of Congress spoke out in favor of the deal. Representative
Spencer Bachus called the deal "a win-win for both exchanges...
[and] exactly the kind of foreign investment in U.S. companies we
should foster and encourage." 137 Representatives Nancy Pelosi and
Barney Frank, strong critics of the Dubai Ports deal, noted that they
were not alarmed by the proposed deal and tried to differentiate the
transaction from the DPW deal by noting that there "the concern was
smuggling something or someone dangerous into ports .... What are
we talking about here-smuggling someone onto a stock
exchange?"' 38 In all, there appeared to be very few in Congress who
raised the national security issues in this deal that had been brought
39
up during the debate over the Dubai Ports acquisition.'
The clearest example of the differences between the Dubai Ports
deal and the NASDAQ deal came recently with the final clearance of
the attempted purchase. 140
On December 31, 2007, NASDAQ
obtained clearance from CFIUS to proceed with the transaction that
would result in the exchange's acquisition of a controlling share in

132.
Joseph B. Treaster, Dubai to Buy Large Stake in Nasdaq, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
20, 2007, at C1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2O07/09/20fbusiness/worldbusiness/
20exchange.html?_r=1&n=Top%2FNews%2FWorld%2FCountries%20and%2OTerritorie
s%2FDenmark&oref-slogin.
133.
Id.; Stephen Labaton & Julia Werdigier, Mild Reaction in Capitol to a Dubai
Nasdaq Stake, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2007, at C7, available at http://www.nytimes.com
2007/09/21/business/worldbusiness/21exchange.html?scp=l&sq=%22Mild% 2OReaction%2
Oin%20Capitol%20to%20a%20Dubai%2ONasdaq%2OStake%22&st=cse.
134.
Labaton & Werdigier, supra note 133; Treaster, supra note 132.
135.
See Labaton & Werdigier, supra note 133 (discussing governmental
responses to Dubai-NASDAQ deal).
136.
Id.
137.
Id.
138.
Id.
139.
See generally id. (reporting congressional responses to the deal).
140.
U.S. Clears Sale of a Stake in Nasdaq, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2008, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/0/10business/worldbusiness/01nasdaq.html?scp=
10
1&sq=%
22U.S.%20Clears%20Sale%20of%2Oa20Stake%20in%2ONasdaq%22&st=cse.
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141
OMX and Borse Dubai obtaining a significant share in NASDAQ.
Subsequently, the OMX board unanimously recommended approving
the transaction at a U.S. equivalent of $41.41 per share, and the
14 2
transaction went forward.

B. Canada
Similar to the controversy experienced in the U.S. regarding its
investment laws, Canada also encountered controversy with proposed
transactions that have tested the commitment of the current
government to the traditional system under the Investment Canada
Act. Like the U.S., Canada must ultimately consider the potential
impact of proposed transactions and decide the manner in which it
wants to proceed into the future with its policy toward foreign
investment.
As previously noted in Part III.C., supra, Canada had seen a
number of its larger businesses-for example, Hudson's Bay and Four
Seasons-acquired by foreign interests. 14 3 Helping to push the issue
of foreign investment into the forefront of national debate in Canada
was the C$5 billion bid to acquire the Canadian based PrimeWest
Energy Trust by TAQA, Abu Dhabi's National Energy Company-a
case closely analogous to that of the proposed Dubai Ports
144
acquisition.
Abu Dhabi, part of the United Arab Emirates, created TAQA in
2005 to function as a holding company for the country's power and
water utilities and to act as an investor in acquiring oil and gas
interests in overseas markets. 145
The Abu Dhabi government
officially owns fifty-one percent of TAQA but holds another twentyfour percent by means of a state-run farmers' support fund, while the
remaining twenty-five percent is traded on a local stock market,
146
where it can only be legally purchased by Abu Dhabi citizens.
PrimeWest, meanwhile, is a gas and oil trust company "with focus on
development drilling, waterflood optimization, workovers and
facilities optimization" and over $375 million in gross income for the
first half of 2007.147 The size of the transaction made it clear that

141.
Id.
142.
OMX Says Board Recommends Borse Dubai Offer, REUTERS, Jan. 2, 2008,
http://www.reuters.com/article/ousiv/idUSSAT00482520080102?rpc=81.
143.
Chase, supra note 92.
144.
Shawn McCarthy, Taqa Deal Faces Strict Review; Ottawa Will Weigh State
Control When Assessing Abu Dhabi's Purchase of PrimeWest, THE GLOBE AND MAIL,
Sept. 26, 2007, at B3.
145.
Id.
146.
Id.
147.
PrimeWest Energy Inc., Profile Canada Business Directory of Companies,
http://www.profilecanada.com/companydetail.cfm?company=135080 Primewest_-Energ
yInc-CalgaryAB (last visited Oct. 27, 2008); see also PrimeWest Energy Trust 2007
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investigation under the ICA was necessary for the transaction to
148
proceed.
The potential acquisition of an energy company by the United
Arab Emirates-owned TAQA touched off a debate in Canada. 149 The
deal ignited concerns that the current system operated too leniently
and curbed consideration of national security concerns under the ICA
review process. 150 One government official expressed the anxieties of
many over the recent run on Canadian businesses in a comment that
"free markets do not mean a free pass. Canada is open for business,
but it's not for sale.' 5 1 Liberal critics of the current system also
expressed concerns that "the Investment Canada Act does not provide
a mandate to consider the ownership of a foreign acquirer, but only
looks at whether the investment represents a net benefit to the
152
country."'
The Conservative government, led by Stephen Harper,
attempted to allay many of the concerns that have arisen over the
transaction by pledging to strictly review the transaction under the
current ICA regime. 153 According to Conservative officials, the ICA
net-benefit test "is a broadly stated test and it allows ultimately the
minister to make decisions based on a full range of issues," including
whether the acquirer is state-owned and whether it is primarily a tool
of foreign governments to achieve policy objectives. 154 Further, the
government also responded in defense of the regime that "[w]e are
not-and we will not become-protectionist. The Investment Canada
Act should not-and will not-become a shield to protect Canadian
industry from the full rigours of global competition."'1 55 Industry
Minister Jim Prentice also noted that while it would be studying the
proposed transaction, the government "is not trying to intervene" in
156
the deal.
In the end, like most of the other deals that go before the ICA
Review Board, the TAQA-PrimeWest deal received the Board's seal of
approval. 157 On November 19, 2007, TAQA obtained clearance from

Quarterly Report, Aug. 1, 2007, available at http://www.primewestenergy.com
PrimeWest/Investors/filings/2007/Q2_2007_Results.pdf.
148.
See Raby, supra note 5, at 397 (outlining conditions under which the
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the Canadian government to proceed with its intended takeover of
PrimeWest at a price of C$26.76 per share, along with an assumption
of the company's debt. 158 By January 17, 2008, the C$4.6 billion
transaction had been completed and PrimeWest's former CEO took
control of TAQA North, part of the company's growing collection of
businesses in Canada. 159 Shortly thereafter, the executives of the
former PrimeWest delisted their company from the Toronto Stock
Exchange, and, in a comment on the addition, the TAQA CEO noted
that the new acquisition would be a "great addition to TAQA North's
existing operations in Canada, providing further scale to help us
capitalize on new and diverse development opportunities. '160 With
that statement, the deal that had caused the minor uproar was
completed.

V.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In most respects, the U.S. system under CFIUS and Exon-Florio
and the Canadian system under the ICA are similar.
Both
governments designed the system to provide an opportunity to
examine potential acquisitions by a foreign buyer and determine
whether the transaction should proceed. 16 1 Both systems allow the
government to intervene in the event that a transaction is deemed
potentially harmful to the country, and either create conditions upon
which it can proceed or put a stop to it altogether. 162 Additionally,
both systems strive to maintain a balance between interfering with
transactions that appear to be harmful and trying not to appear
hostile to foreign investment. 163 As the recent debates in both
countries suggest, a thin line exists between the two objectives. Since
both countries are positioned to consider new approaches to their
current systems, now is a prudent time to consider the benefits and
drawbacks of the changes and the best course of action.
A. Pros and Cons of New Approaches
The changes implemented under FINSA made positive additions
to the current system. Requiring that a specific set of criteria be used

158.
Id.
159. Abu Dhabi Deal for PrimeWest Is in the Books, TORONTO STAR, Jan. 17,
2008, at B5, available at http:lwww.thestar.com/article/294816.
160.
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161.
Byrne, supra note 5, at 856-57; see also Raby, supra note 5, at 397
(outlining conditions under which the acquisition of control of a Canadian business is
reviewable).
162.
McKenzie, supra note 73; Sud, supra note 5, at 1316-17.
163.
See Sosnow et al., supra note 94 ("Canada is open for business, but it's not
for sale.").
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when evaluating transactions simplifies the review process for
evaluators and allows more predictability for businesses who submit
their proposed transactions to CFIUS. 164 Further review by the
Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of the Treasury
adds another layer of protection to the review process and can, to a
greater degree, assure Congress and the President that the report
from CFIUS is dependable. 165 Similarly, requiring more extensive
disclosure to Congress about the specific details of a proposed
transaction reinforces the notion that the transaction is in good faith,
which decreases the possibility of another potential public relations
166
fiasco, similar to that which occurred during the Dubai Ports deal.
Further, dealing more carefully with potential security concerns is
positive, especially considering the concerns that consistently remain
at the forefront of many different policy issues. Including a review
process that emphasizes the particular concerns surrounding national
security reinforces the country's ability to discover any real threats
and increase confidence that the government is taking all precautions
to deal with such issues.
While similar changes in the ICA have not yet been passed in
Ottawa, there would be benefits to adjusting certain functions of the
current system. With foreign buyers taking over a growing number of
Canadian businesses, many of those proposing changes to the ICA
system fear that the country is "becoming the boy scouts of the world
in this area."'1 67 Tightening review standards, even actually turning
down a potential transaction (something yet to be done under the
ICA), would place buyers on notice that the government review
system will not be pushed aside easily and reinforce the idea that
"Canada is open for business, but it's not for sale.' 168 Further,
specific provisions requiring consideration of national security
concerns in a proposed transaction and further scrutiny for deals
involving state-owned enterprises allow for a more in-depth study of
such issues, while simultaneously inspiring more confidence overall
169
that the deals provide a net benefit to Canada.
Along with the potential positive changes in the U.S. system,
there are also negatives that may result. The U.S. faces a dangerous
problem if it appears hostile to foreign investment. 170 Even if the

164.
See USLaw.com, supra note 46 (setting out the new requirements under
FINSA).
165.
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changes in the system still allow the vast majority of transactions to
proceed, perception in this area may be very meaningful. In a time
when the trade deficit is rising, appearing hostile to further
171
investment in the U.S. economy engenders further harm.
Similarly, requiring expanded review of areas qualifying as "critical
infrastructure and critical technologies," including power plants, toll
roads, and ports, may discourage investment in these areas.
Additionally, fears surrounding the media scrutiny experienced
during the Dubai Ports World transaction may also discourage
investment. 172
Such fears may also cause hesitation among
businesses and countries that are likely to raise national security
173
concerns in the U.S.
Similar concerns may be raised about many of the proposed
changes to the ICA. Under FIRA, Canada has already seen the
effects of appearing hostile to foreign investment. 174 The recession
and mounting international scrutiny facilitated the Conservative
takeover of the government and the passage of the ICA in the first
place. 175 Inserting a specific provision into ICA consideration may
also add confusion to the review system. Under the current review
process, the government is allowed to consider a number of factors
and give more weight to specific factors depending on the
circumstances. 176
Placing primacy on national security review
removes some of the flexibility of the Canadian net benefit review
system and diminishes the likelihood of certain continued investment
in the Canadian economy, particularly investment originating in
countries more likely to raise national security issues.
B. Option: The Creation of the "ConciliationCommittee"
After weighing the benefits and drawbacks of the potential and
actual changes that have occurred to the Exon-Florio and CFIUS
system and the ICA system, as well as the effects of the recent events
that have prompted these debates, both the U.S. and Canada must
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actively court foreign investment following the Dubai Ports aftermath).
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decide the optimal direction for their respective foreign investment
policies. It appears that the best solution lies in maintaining their
current standards to allow for a rigorous review system and creating
a "Conciliation Committee" to handle deals with sensitive political
overtones. Creating such a committee allows an independent agency
to broken agreements between countries.
In the U.S., the current system has most often let deals proceed
under a fair investigation that examines the merits and potential
complications of each deal. As the NASDAQ deal demonstrates, the
current systems may strictly review transactions that raise concerns,
but ultimately permit the consummation of the transaction once the
concerns have been addressed. 177 It is in the more politically
sensitive cases, however, that the need for the Conciliation
Committee becomes apparent. Approaching transactions with an eye
toward compromise could help the United States toe the line between
policies that are too exclusionary and too inclusive.
The U.S. would like to avoid another case like the Dubai Ports
deal. Dubai Ports was not only disastrous domestically for the Bush
Administration, but it also likely discouraged other potential foreign
investors. 178 This rings especially true for Arab investors, as many
were in an uproar over the U.S. response to the deal, noting that the
whole outrage over the transaction "smacked of racism. '179 If a
situation like the Dubai Ports arose again, the Conciliation
Committee could step in to broker a deal that would be satisfactory to
both sides, both economically and politically.
One way to create the Conciliation Committee in the U.S. is
creating a bipartisan governmental committee composed of both
representatives and senators to work as a mediator. Members of the
Committee would be appointed by the President, with equal
representation given to each party. Deals would be referred to the
Committee by a simple majority vote in either the House or Senate.
Because the new regulations require expanded disclosure, both
houses should have ample access in order to determine the status of
the transaction.
The committee would act as a mediator between the parties to
the deal and a government appointee to represent those expressing
concerns with the deal. The committee would prepare a report based
on its hearings, the findings of which would be adopted as a
precondition to the deal's proceeding. Allowing politicians, who
tended to raise the initial alarm over problematic deals, to have a

177.
See U.S. Clears Sale of a Stake in Nasdaq, supra note 140 (noting the
clearance of the transaction by the U.S. government).
178.
See Swanson, supra note 173 and accompanying text.
179.
AIG Unit to Buy Dubai Company's U.S. Ports, USA TODAY, Dec. 12, 2006,
http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/2006-12-11-dubai-portsx.htm.
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voice in the process could help to quell political pressures and further
180
legitimize the Committee's report.
Canada could create a similar committee that could function in
the same procedural fashion.
The committee would have to
incorporate the major parties in power, and the members could be
appointed by the Prime Minister to preserve the notion of
bipartisanship. If the legislature found a deal questionable, it could
submit the deal to the Canadian Conciliation Committee, which
would have a say in the matter before any final approval was given
by the Ministers. The committee would also address the concerns of
Canadian politicians who have pushed for the inclusion of a specific
provision for consideration of national security issues, because
provisions addressing such concerns could be included in the
181
committee's recommendations.
Overall, the Conciliation Committee would be useful as an outlet
for the political system in cases that raise issues in need of further
exploration. By giving the legislative branches a greater voice in the
resolution of these potentially hot-button political issues, concerns
may be defused before a media circus develops, and the ultimate
decision-makers-the President or the Canadian Ministers-could be
more confident that their decisions are made in the best interests of
their country.
Both countries realize the importance of continued foreign
investment and appearing to be a favorable locale to invest money.
The assurance that the governments are willing to come to the
bargaining table to reach an agreement may settle other countries'
concerns about investment in the U.S. or Canada.
Thus, the
Conciliation Committee could preserve strict review of transactions
while maintaining a positive image abroad and not inciting the fears
of a number of investors that they will come under attack if they
attempt to bring their investments into the U.S. or Canada.

VI. CONCLUSION

Both the United States and Canada have long realized the
importance of allowing foreign investment and acquisitions and have
182
typically maintained a climate friendly to such business ventures.
The purpose of each of the respective committees in the first place

180.
See Weisman, supra note 119 (discussing the many concerns of members of
Congress).
181.
See Chase, supra note 92 (noting politicians' concerns over the lack of a
national security provision).
182.
See generally Raby, supra note 5 (discussing approaches to foreign direct
investment in the Canadian context); Sud, supra note 5 (discussing approaches to
foreign direct investment in the American context).
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was to regulate investment while still remaining open to the always
important influxes of capital. Changes to the CFIUS system in the
U.S. after the Dubai Ports fallout and the proposed changes to the
ICA, however, may cause some investors-particularly those with
Middle Eastern ties-to think twice before entering what could
become an awkward political battle. 8 3 As concerns over national
security continue to take precedence in the minds of many, both
countries must find a way to maintain a strict review system that
allows them to investigate such concerns while still promoting foreign
investment and projecting an image that encourages foreign
participation in the economy.
While this may be a fine line to walk, one way to satisfy all sides
is through the creation of a Conciliation Committee that would
handle cases found by the legislature to need more independent
consideration. The committee would function as a neutral arbiter for
cases where there are concerns raised by politicians that could not be
otherwise resolved. The committee would have to be bipartisan and
would attempt to allow for a fair hearing of both sides of the issue,
both from those involved in the deal and from those whose concerns
would be raised. The committee would be able to examine closely the
specifics of the deal and make reasonable proposals that would be
required to be adopted for the deal to be allowed to move forward.
Such a committee could easily fit into both the U.S. and
Canadian systems. In this way, the politicians could be satisfied that
they have had their say without feeling the need to raise a media
firestorm over the issue. Further, the parties to the deal could be
confident that they can reach a reasonable compromise and proceed
with less scrutiny and backlash. Neither party wants to be involved
with front-page debates regarding the dangers their transaction poses
to a country's national security. Given the importance of continued
flows of foreign investment to both countries, keeping all parties
happy in these cases is the key to achieving outcomes beneficial to
both the companies and the countries involved.
Part of the system that has allowed both Wal-Mart and Royal
Bank to grow to the largest business in their respective countries has
been the ability to expand not only domestically but internationally
as well. If the U.S. and Canada want their domestic businesses to
have the continued ability to grow in such ways, they will likely
expect that foreign countries will be welcoming to such expansion.
Likewise, growing businesses from other countries would have the
right to expect laws that reciprocate this understanding, and allow
their businesses access into the U.S. and Canadian markets. In this
way, the Wal-Marts and Royal Banks of other countries can continue
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to grow without the fear of inciting a furious storm of opposition when
they look to continue to expand both domestically and internationally.
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